Deals on Wheels: An Analysis of the New Federal Auto Feebate by Robin Banerjee
C.D. Howe Institute
Backgrounder
www.cdhowe.org No. 108, November 2007
Deals on Wheels
An Analysis of the
New Federal Auto Feebate
Robin Banerjee
The Backgrounder in Brief
Ottawa's new feebate program to promote fuel efficiency 
in new cars requires some major retooling.About the Author
Robin Banerjee is a Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute.
The C.D. Howe Institute
The C.D. Howe Institute is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that aims to improve
Canadians’ standard of living by fostering sound economic and social policy.
The Institute promotes the application of independent research and analysis to major economic
and social issues affecting the quality of life of Canadians throughout the country. It takes a global
perspective by considering the impact of international factors on Canada and bringing insights from
other jurisdictions to the discussion of Canadian policy. Recommendations in the Institute’s
publications are founded on quality research conducted by leading experts and subject to rigorous
peer review. The Institute communicates clearly the analysis and recommendations arising from its
work to the general public, the media, academia, experts, and policy makers.
The Institute began life in 1958 when a group of prominent business and labour leaders organized
the Private Planning Association of Canada to research and promote educational activities related to
public economic and social policy. The PPAC renamed itself the C.D. Howe Research Institute in 1973
following a merger with the C.D. Howe Memorial Foundation, an organization created in 1961 to
memorialize the Right Honourable Clarence Decatur Howe. In 1981, the Institute adopted its current
name after the Memorial Foundation again became a separate entity to focus more directly on
memorializing C.D. Howe. The C.D. Howe Institute will celebrate its 50th Anniversary as the gold
standard for Canadian public policy research in 2008.
The Institute encourages participation in and support of its activities from business, organized
labour, associations, the professions, and interested individuals. For further information, please contact
the Institute’s Development Officer.
The Chairman of the Institute is Tim Hearn; William B.P. Robson is President and Chief Executive
Officer.
* * * * * *
C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
©
is an occasional publication of the C.D. Howe Institute. Its purpose is to comment briefly on policy
issues of concern to Canadians. Michael Benedict and James Fleming edited the manuscript; Heather Vilistus prepared it for publication.
As with all Institute publications, the views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the
Institute’s members or Board of Directors.
To order a hard copy of this publication, please contact: Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd., 5369 Canotek Rd., Unit 1, Ottawa K1J 9J3
(tel.: 613-745-2665; fax: 613-745-7660 e-mail: order.dept@renoufbooks.com), or the C.D. Howe Institute, 67 Yonge Street, Suite 300, Toronto
M5E 1J8 (tel.: 416-865-1904; fax: 416-865-1866; e-mail: cdhowe@cdhowe.org). Quotation with appropriate credit is permissible.
$5.00; ISBN 0-88806-728-3;
ISSN 1499-7983 (print); ISSN 1499-7991 (online)C
anadians are becoming increasingly engaged in heated debates about
how to respond to the potential threats of global climate change to the
environment and the economy. Even though Canada’s obligations to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol now seem
unattainable in the short run, a consensus seems to be emerging among
policymakers that emissions reductions need to be undertaken in a fashion that
minimizes negative effects on the economy.
Clearly, policies to deal with the automotive sector’s emissions will be a key
part of any reduction plan. Emissions from light vehicles currently account for
about 12 percent of Canada’s total greenhouse gas emissions.
1 The federal
government has several options to achieve emissions reductions. They can be used
alone or in combination, and include market-based measures, such as subsidies or
tax increases (either on gasoline or on CO2 directly via a carbon tax); and non-
market instruments, such as regulations on vehicle fuel economy or measures to
encourage switching from gasoline to alternate fuels.
One of the key elements of Ottawa’s current strategy is its so-called 
“feebate.” A feebate is a market-based instrument that provides a financial
incentive for consumers and manufacturers to shift towards more fuel-efficient
vehicles by subsidizing fuel efficiency and taxing fuel inefficiency. Within this
framework, there remains a wide variety of ways in which the government 
can structure a feebate program to achieve varying levels of fuel efficiency at
varying levels of costs. 
Although many economists and environmentalists support feebate programs,
such measures raise theoretical, empirical and practical questions: Are feebates a
better alternative than regulations? Do consumers actually react to them? Are they
preferable to broader-based gasoline or emissions taxes?
This Backgrounder argues that the federal government should address such
concerns as it goes forward with its feebate program. As well, the paper argues
that Ottawa’s feebate program should be consistent with a broader approach,
which would include tools like emissions taxes.
The paper begins with a summary of the federal plan, followed by a
discussion of the limited experience in Canada and abroad with auto feebate
schemes. Next comes a review of some alternative methods for reducing fuel use
and an overview of some analytical issues in evaluating feebates. Finally, the
paper puts forth policy recommendations.
Ottawa’s Feebate Plan
The federal government’s 2007 budget introduced a feebate scheme known as the
“vehicle efficiency initiative.” It combines a rebate program for fuel-efficient
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1 The value is from Canada (2005) and represents the sum of emissions from “Gasoline
Automobile” and “Light Duty Gasoline Trucks.” The transportation sector as a whole accounts
for more than a quarter of all emissions. The report singles out a 109 percent increase in Light
Duty Truck emissions between 1990–2005 driven largely by the popularity of SUVs.vehicles with a tax on fuel-inefficient ones. The benchmark is fuel consumption in
litres per 100 km driven.
2 Although a direct focus on CO2 may be more effective in
combating global warming, fuel consumption has the benefit of public familiarity
since it is a factor that consumers already consider when making vehicle purchase
decisions.
A feebate involves both taxing vehicles that fail to reach a target and
subsidizing the purchase of those vehicles that perform better than the target.
3
Some policy options in designing a feebate program are:
(i) The “pivot point,” where rebates switch to taxes;
(ii) The rate of the tax and subsidy;
(iii)Whether to use different schedules (pivot points and rates) for different
types of vehicles;
(iv)Whether to use a linear feebate or to include “dead-zones” where the
feebate doesn’t apply; and
(v) Whether to impose caps on taxes and rebate amounts.
The current subsidy, the ecoAUTO Rebate Program, offers a rebate of between
$1,000 and $2,000 for cars with fuel-efficiency levels of better than 6.5 litres per 100
km or light trucks achieving better than 8.3 L/100km. In practice, only 10 car
models and nine truck models are eligible for rebates for the 2006 and 2007 model
years.
4 Additionally, the initiative has a rebate for flex-fuel vehicles, which run on
a combination of gasoline and ethanol, and have E85
5 ratings of at least 13
L/100km. Four models of flex-fuel vehicles achieved this standard in the 2006 and
2007 model years.
The Green Levy on Fuel Inefficient Vehicles imposes a tax that starts at $1,000
for vehicles which use between 13 L/100km and 14 L/100km and proceeds in
$1,000 steps for every litre increase in consumption up to 16 L/100km. At that
point, the tax is capped: all vehicles that use 16 L/100km or more are subject to the
same maximum $4,000 tax.
The federal government had been studying the possibility of using feebates for
some time, commissioning two major reports, the first in 1999 and another in 2005.
As well, the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE)
was tasked with examining the possibility of using feebates under a set of
guidelines that included environmental effectiveness and revenue neutrality.
NRTEE’s conclusions will be discussed below after introducing some background
about fuel-reduction policy and some analytical results on feebates.
2 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
2 Based on a combination of city (55 percent) and highway (45 percent) driving. In principle, a
feebate could also target fuel economy, the distance travelled on a given amount of fuel, or
carbon dioxide emissions directly. 
3 Targeting consumers or manufacturers will have the same effect if manufacturers pass on the
rebates or taxes. 
4 “Finance officials estimate about five per cent of vehicles on the market would be subject to the
fee and about three per cent would qualify for the fuel efficiency rebate.” Globe and Mail, March
19th, 2007: “Environment: Fee slapped on SUVs.”
5 A fuel mixture which is up to 85 percent ethanol.Limited Grounds for Comparison
Although the concept and specific proposals for auto feebates have existed for
several years, the policy has not been implemented in a significant way elsewhere
in the world. As a result, there is no international empirical evidence of a feebate’s
impact on consumer choices and manufacturer reactions. Several jurisdictions in
the United States and overseas have announced intentions to introduce various
versions of feebate programs, so the accumulation of evidence should increase if
and when these programs are put in place.
Governments in Canada have been in the forefront of examining and
implementing feebate policies. In addition to the new federal plan, Ontario has
had a version of a feebate in place for several years. However, the parameters of
Ontario’s feebate program are such that it works, in effect, as a gas-guzzler tax
rather than as a balanced tax-rebate scheme designed to alter purchasing
behaviour. The vast majority of cars sold in Ontario fall within the range of a $100
rebate or a $75 tax, with 90 percent subject to the $75 tax (Barg et al., 2000). These
amounts are likely too small to affect individual purchasing decisions on cars that
cost tens of thousands of dollars. As well, the uniformity of the financial incentive
does not provide consumers with a sufficient reason to purchase even lower
emissions models. Indeed, it is unlikely that most auto consumers in Ontario are
even aware of the program, since it is not prominently advertised. 
The Role of Feebates in the Broader Policy Context
Emissions from the automobile and broader transportation sector are related to 
the average fuel economy of the vehicle fleet, as well as distances driven. Using
targeted economic instruments should allow for a more efficient transition
towards a lower carbon economy.
Most economists favour market-based instruments, such as taxes, over
regulatory measures. Offering consumers the freedom to adjust their behaviour in
reaction to small differences in prices usually produces the desired results more
efficiently than a fixed set of regulations. These types of instruments also get
around the problem of amassing the large amounts of information that may be
needed to make regulations effective and efficient. Two types of instruments
considered below are gas taxes and feebates.
After a carbon tax, an increase in the gasoline tax is well-suited as an
instrument to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because higher prices tend to
reduce fuel use which, in turn, will reduce emissions. A gas tax increase will also
encourage long-term changes in fuel use by encouraging people to buy more
efficient cars, thus increasing average fuel economy.
6 Consumers also may be
induced to make changes to travel patterns by, say, living closer to public transit 
or moving nearer their workplaces (yielding additional benefits from reduced
congestion, pollution and accidents).
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6 It may also encourage technological switching to automobiles which run on alternative fuels,
such as ethanol or electricity. Despite large fluctuations in the nominal price of oil, which makes up a large
part of the non-tax price of gasoline, the real world price of oil has remained fairly
stable (see Figure 1). Since the real effect of the oil price has been muted, there may
be scope to use gasoline taxes to magnify the effect on buyers.
7 However, several
drawbacks would need to be taken into account. According to a recent Angus Reid
poll, an increase in the gasoline tax would encounter major public resistance.
Despite concern for the environment, only 29 percent of the respondents favoured
“an additional 25-cent tax per litre of gasoline” (Angus Reid Strategies, 2007). 
Additionally, gas tax hikes are politically difficult because such increases will
affect rural residents and those with lower incomes more severely.
8 Recent studies
have also shown that short-run adjustments in consumption to increases in the
price of gasoline are not large (i.e. the short-run price elasticity of demand is low).
9
Economists Ian Parry and Kenneth Small (2004) assert that incorporating the costs
of global warming externalities in a tax would not increase gas prices by more
4 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
7 Crude oil is the largest and most volatile input to gasoline production, to which much of the
recent volatility in gasoline prices can be traced. Increases in crude oil prices are quickly passed
through to consumers (Natural Resources Canada, 2005). The other major components of the
price of gasoline are taxes, refining and distribution costs, and local market factors. 
8 For some examples of the use of household level data to evaluate the effects on different types of
individuals see: Kayser (2000) and Nicol (2003).
9 For a sample of work on gasoline price demand elasticities see: Dahl and Sterner (1991a and
1991b); Epsey (1996 and 1998); Kayser (2000); Nicol (2003). For evidence that there has been a
recent shift towards an even lower elasticity of demand, see Hughes et al. (2007). For an



















































Nominal Oil Price Real Oil Price adjusted for inflation and exchange rates (Base: 1973)
Source:  OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006.
Figure 1:  Crude Oil Price (Nominal and Real)than a few cents, which implies that it would be difficult to justify a rise in the gas
tax to levels high enough to affect consumers.
10 
Still, a fuel tax can be effective in reducing fuel consumption over the long
term, by reducing mileage driven, and could complement a more effective strategy
that targets the purchase of new cars. A reason to target car purchases directly
rather than relying exclusively on a gas tax is that there is evidence that
consumers by and large are unable to accurately measure the dollar value of fuel
C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 5
Box 1: An Example of the Effects of Underestimating Fuel Savings
Many studies of feebates rely on suggestions from survey results that consumers often have
trouble calculating the full lifetime fuel cost savings from driving a more fuel-efficient car. A
commonly asserted value for a consumer’s timeline for calculating fuel savings is three years
(i.e. consumers have a three-year discounted payback period for fuel savings).
The following example will demonstrate the potential effects of using a three-year payback
period instead of taking into account fuel savings over the lifetime of the car:
Imagine a consumer is considering buying one of two types of cars: Car A has a fuel efficiency
of 10 L/100km and Car B has a fuel efficiency of 12 L/100km. These two cars are basically the
same other than the fuel-use ratings; i.e. same basic features, styling, etc.
If our hypothetical individual drives 20,000 km per year and the price of gasoline is $1/L,
then yearly gasoline costs will be $2,000 for driving Car A and $2,400 for driving Car B.
How does this affect the car purchase decision? If the consumer has a three-year payback
period and a discount rate of 10 percent, then the gasoline savings from driving the more fuel-
efficient Car A instead of Car B will be $994.74. So, if all else is equal, the consumer should be
willing to pay up to $994.74 more for Car A. If Car A and Car B have the same features, then
the fuel savings will make Car A more valuable due to the fuel savings.
Now assume that a car has an average lifetime of 15 years. The value of the lifetime fuel
savings to the consumer from driving Car A instead of Car B is now $3,042.43. So again, all else
equal, Car A is now notionally worth more than $3,000 more than Car B; this is obviously a
more significant incentive. One can clearly see that with a full lifetime perspective, the fuel
savings are worth over three times more.
Many of the economic benefits that computer models of feebates show come from forcing
consumers to realize the extra benefits from valuing the full lifetime fuel savings from their car
purchases.
This discussion has focused on consumers using a short payback period. Dreyfus and
Viscusi (1995) also estimate that consumers use a high discount rate when evaluating fuel
efficiency, which would lead to the same results. Indeed, a combination of high discount rate
and a short payback period would cause the largest distortions.
10 They estimate that using a value for the estimated cost of carbon dioxide of $25/ton of carbon
implies a tax of only six cents per gallon of gasoline, since a gallon contains .0024 tons of carbon.
Assuming they are referring to short tons, the rough conversion would be a tax of $0.016/L. Since
even the highest estimates of the economic externality only range up to about US$100/tC (the
paper quotes a range of possible global warming costs of US$0.7 to US$100 yielding a per gallon
cost range of 0.2 to 24 cents per gallon), the optimal tax will never be more than a few tens of cents. efficiency differences between vehicles over their useful lifetimes.
11 Box 1
illustrates the potential effects of incorrectly measuring lifetime fuel savings. 
One non-market approach that does appear to reduce fuel use in new cars is
regulation. The US Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards and similar
measures in Canada had a major impact on fuel economy in the 1970s and 1980s,
(Hughes et al., 2007). Recently, Ottawa negotiated a Memorandum of
Understanding with auto manufacturers regarding the acceptable level of
emissions from new cars, although this sort of non-binding regulation has had an
unclear incentive effect on auto manufacturers.
12 However, in addition to the
reasons for preferring market-based instruments noted above, regulations need
continuous updates, which can prove both contentious and complicated.
Designing the Most Effective Feebate 
13
Changing the basic features of a feebate plan will modify the impact on average
fuel efficiency as financial incentives are changed. Increasing the tax rate, reducing
the pivot point, reducing the number of schedules, and eliminating the dead zones
and caps will all tend to reduce fuel use over time. This type of incentive policy is
understood and supported by the public; the same polls that show severe
opposition to increases in gasoline taxes also show significant support for gas-
guzzler taxes and rebates for higher fuel-economy vehicles.
14
Another attractive feature of feebates is that the choice of the pivot point can
be made in such a way that the policy is revenue neutral, i.e., the amount paid out
in subsidies exactly balances the amount received in taxes. Of course, the pivot
could also be set in order to generate revenues for the government, or to provide a
net subsidy to automobile consumers. 
Although there has not been an opportunity to study auto feebates empirically,
a number of studies (including two done for the federal government) have used
6 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
11 For example, see: Greene (2007), Kurani and Turrentine (2004) and Marbek Resource Consultants
Ltd. (2005). There is evidence that recent rises in the price of gasoline have spurred purchases of
smaller vehicles, which is consistent with a larger long-run price elasticity of demand for gasoline.
Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995) estimated consumers’ discount rate for fuel savings to be between 11
and 17 percent, a value that they found to be consonant with prevailing market rates in auto loans,
but higher than conventional estimates of the social discount rate of around 5 percent. In addition,
a wide variety of studies on discount rates for operating efficiencies in various durable goods, such
as appliances, have found much higher values than 17 percent, (see Dreyfus and Viscusi 1995 for a
discussion). More study is needed to determine the nature of the relationship between gasoline
prices and consumers’ ability to determine associated lifetime costs.
12 An and Sauer (2004) found that Canada has some of the worst fuel economy results in the world.
For some discussion of progress so far, see Canada (2007). Ottawa published a Notice of Intent in
October 2006 to build on the MOU’s voluntary provisions by implementing new fuel-efficiency
regulations starting with the 2011 model year.
13 This section draws on a number of US and Canadian studies on the prospects for feebates. From
the US: Greene et al. (2005); US DOE (1995); Langer (2005). From Canada: HDL Decision
Economics Inc. (1999) and Marbek Resource Consultants Ltd. (2005).
14 Angus Reid Strategies (2007). It is unclear how these social preferences will change as increasing
numbers of vehicles become exposed to taxes, although the balancing increase in rebates should
make this increase more palatable. C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 7
computer simulations to model the possible effects. The general conclusions from
these studies confirm what economic intuition suggests regarding financial
incentives to buy fuel-efficient cars: people tend not to buy cars that are made
relatively more expensive by a feebate policy.
The most important finding is that a wide range of possible feebate rates and
structures can produce positive environmental effects, (there is also a positive net
economic benefit from the realization of fuel savings). 
Another key insight is that, in the models, the majority of the effects of a
feebate policy seem to come from manufacturers attempts to preserve their market
shares through technological innovation and improvements to their vehicles.
Implementing innovative technologies often makes more economic sense once the
added financial incentives of the feebate are in place. The adoption of such new
technologies has a much greater positive impact than that of consumers switching
to smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles in order to take advantage of the rebates
and avoid the tax. But there is also a rebound effect which works against the
policy, as consumers-now able to travel further at lower cost—offset some of the
efficiency—related reduction through higher use. However, even with the increase
in fuel consumption due to this rebound effect, the studies still anticipate an
overall positive result.
The simulation results suggest that there are strong benefits from coordinating
policies across jurisdictions. Since technological innovations are such a strong
driver of benefits from a feebate policy, any marginal increase in the return on
investment of implementing new technologies will improve the effectiveness of
the policy. For example, an auto manufacturer will be more willing to introduce a
new technology or model redesign if the fixed cost can be spread among a greater
number of consumers. This implies that a policy that is, for example, coordinated
between the US and Canada, will be more effective than a Canada-only policy.
Domestic sales are usually a small percentage of total sales for most models that
Canadians can choose from. Indeed, even most Canadian vehicles are
manufactured for export. Thus, there is less incentive to redesign models
specifically for Canada.
A phase-in period for the policy reduces the net reductions in fuel use by
delaying the short-run benefits, but provides manufacturers with more time to
implement some of the technological improvements and redesigns that will help
them maintain market share. This is especially critical for the North American
manufacturers who are predicted to lose market share due to their reliance on
sales of larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles. 
Feebate policies also are found to have less of an effect on fuel use in the
presence of strong, effective regulation. However, regulations are not able to
provide continuous incentive for improvement, as feebates do, unless they are
updated on a regular basis. Another consideration: a large increase in the price of
gasoline as a result of market forces will obviously reduce the effects of the feebate
policy on fuel use, although the inability of consumers to correctly value fuel
savings implies that positive benefits can still be found.Assessing the Federal Government’s Plan
When the federal feebate plan is examined in light of the design parameters set
out above, several deficiencies emerge. The first is that Ottawa implemented the
program without adequate consultation with the industry. Secondly, it took effect
immediately without mandating a timetable, or at least a phase-in period. As
discussed, the simulation evidence strongly suggests that a large part of the gains
from a feebate scheme come from attempts by manufacturers to preserve market
share by introducing new fuel-saving technologies or by redesigning their vehicles
to make them more fuel efficient. It follows, therefore, that pre-announcing the
policy and giving manufacturers more time to adjust their models would have
reduced their costs.  
Indeed, the simulation models generally suggest that feebates will produce a
decrease in market share for the “Big Three” North American auto manufacturers,
without a large reduction in overall demand for automobiles. The implication is
that the “Big Three” may be better able to compete if given a period of adjustment
to re-tool their fleets, since on average, they sell less fuel-efficient vehicles.
15
General policies to aid Canadian-based manufacturers, such as reductions in
the marginal tax rates on new investment, would also help ameliorate the effects
of the feebate on them. However, policies which may have net environmental and
economic benefits should not be shied away from for the sole purpose of
protecting the market share of the North American-owned auto manufacturers.
The current feebate structure is not a linear curve, but rather contains a “dead-
zone” in which most vehicles fall. As noted above, most vehicles are not subject to
the incentives. This reduces the effectiveness of the policy and reduces the impetus
for manufacturers to make continuous improvements. 
Revenue neutrality is an attractive potential feature of feebates since they
combine revenue and expenses in the same instrument, (although a net tax would
provide a marginal incentive towards a reduction in the number of vehicles).
Although the federal plan is not expected to result in a large net inflow of tax
revenue, it will need to be adjusted over time to maintain revenue neutrality.
However, the non-linear nature of the feebate might make this exercise difficult. 
Another problem with the federal plan is that it exempts pickup trucks, which
are regarded as primarily commercial vehicles. One possible consequence is that
consumers might switch to these vehicles in order to avoid the tax on other larger
vans and trucks. This exemption also means the possibility for reducing fuel use in
the commercial sector remains unaddressed. In principle, profit-maximizing firms
should already be choosing the least fuel-intensive vehicles that fit their needs in
order to minimize fuel costs. But the introduction of a subsidy could make seeking
further improvements economical at the firm level.
The major motivation for the feebate was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
In a recent C.D. Howe Institute study, Jaccard et al. (2007) estimate that the feebate
will reduce Canadian emissions by at most 1 Megatonne of CO2 equivalent by
8 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
15 It is worth bearing in mind that an increasing volume of Canadian auto manufacturing, both in
assembly and parts, is now generated by “foreign”-owned manufacturers.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 9
2010. Clearly, the plan alone will make only a small contribution to achieving
ambitious emissions reduction targets. If the government wishes to induce greater
reductions as a result of this policy, then the rate will have to be adjusted to
provide greater incentives.
Policy Recommendations
The current program is a first step in introducing market instruments to help
address concerns about fuel use. Going forward, the government should take 
steps to ensure that the program is improved in such a way that it is more
environmentally effective by providing a greater incentive to switch to lower-
emission vehicles, but balancing any changes with an attempt to minimize 
adverse consequences on the auto manufacturing sector. 
Since many of the likely gains will come from technological innovations and
redesigns of current models, the adverse effect of the feebate on domestic auto
manufacturers should be lessened by pre-announcing the path of the feebate over
time so that the auto manufacturers have sufficient time to adjust their plans. A
time frame of several years to introduce major changes is reasonable, given the
long lead times required in auto manufacturing. Any increase in regulated
emissions reductions would overlap with the feebate and may provide a basis for
a reduction in the feebate rate, although the feebate will continue to have positive
effects.
The current feebate uses a rate of $1,000 per L/100km, which is in line with the
rate recommended by the federal government’s studies, however the feebate
structure should apply to more vehicles to ensure that correct incentives are
present. Revenue neutrality (on average) can also be attained if the government
slightly adjusts the pivot point and rates from year to year to ensure that the
expected tax earnings are balanced by the payouts in rebates, although such
adjustments can introduce uncertainty into manufacturers’ plans. In its analysis of
feebates, the NRTEE recommended that they not be implemented in isolation but
rather as part of a “comprehensive, integrated strategy” for the transport sector.
Since feebates only directly affect new car purchases, the government should take
this advice to heart and ensure that its policies are actually part of a coherent plan. 
One area that the current feebate regime misses is the used-car market. The
federal government has also announced a program that will pay to scrap older
cars. Although this will speed up the improvement in average fuel economy, the
feebate in isolation will also achieve this goal over time as older cars are replaced
by vehicles purchased under the feebate incentives. 
It is essential to maintain an incentive for people to travel less. This involves
maintaining, or possibly increasing the cost of using fuel. Examples of policies to
target travel are: the basic fuel tax, (which although perhaps not ideal for
influencing fuel efficiency in new cars, will still affect how far those cars are
driven); a carbon tax; or mileage-based charges, (which also target emissions from
driving, but less directly, and thus less efficiently than a fuel or carbon tax.)
16 Such
16 An innovative new suggestion from a reviewer is the use of Pay as You Drive automobile
insurance, which also provides incentive to reduce distance travelled.10 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
taxes would also provide an added incentive for drivers to switch to more fuel-
efficient cars. As well, they could alter other lifestyle choices such as the distance
from home to work and the amount of public transit usage.
In general, the federal government should continue to implement
environmental policy via market instruments. Feebates offer an opportunity to
overcome a potential undervaluing of fuel savings by consumers while reducing
or even neutralizing revenue effects on the government. Ultimately a long-term,
incentive-based perspective will allow the government to effect desired changes in
the most efficient way possible.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 11
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